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I.

INTRODUCTION
The inductive reasoning test aptly titled, “The Duck Test,” provides, “If it walks like a

duck, swims like a duck, and quacks like a duck, it's a duck.”1 Judge George Wu echoed this
humorous sentiment in Fox TV Stations, Inc. v. Aereokiller (“FilmOn Cal”) holding that FilmOn,
an Internet-based retransmission service, was a cable service as defined by 17 U.S.C § 111(f)(3)
of the Copyright Act of 1976 (hereinafter the “Copyright Act”).2 Judge Wu did not rely on the
legislative history or agency opinions—unlike the Second Circuit3—nor did he wax philosophical
whether the Internet is a tangible place—unlike the District of Columbia (“DC”) District Court.4
Instead Judge Wu based his opinion on the plain language of the law and used common sense to
determine a facility in this context. This comment focuses on the recent opinions from the Second
Circuit, Central District of California, and DC District Court that address Internet retransmission
services (sometimes referred to as “Internet TV”). The issue in all three cases is whether an
Internet retransmission system, which streams copyrighted television programming live and over
the Internet, can qualify as a cable system for purposes of § 111 of the Copyright Act of 1976 and,
therefore, be eligible to obtain a “compulsory license” to retransmit broadcast signals. 5 To put it
concisely, the arguments boil down to whether an Internet retransmission service is a cable system.
The Copyright Act defines a cable system as follows:
[A] facility, located in any State . . . that in whole or in part receives signals transmitted or programs
broadcast by one or more television broadcast stations licensed by the FCC, and makes secondary

1

See, e.g., GE Betz, Inc. v. Zee Co., 718 F.3d 615, 630 (7th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted) (determining whether “a
participant in a judicial proceeding [that] has all the qualities of a defendant . . . [is], in fact, [] a defendant.”); BMC
Indus. v. Barth Indus., 160 F.3d 1322, 1338 n. 28 (11th Cir. 1998) (The “duck test” has received wide support from
the courts.).
2
Fox TV Stations, Inc. v. Aereokiller, 115 F. Supp 3d 1152 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (“[I]t is difficult to recognize the
ambiguity the Second Circuit saw in the statute, at least as applied to the facts of this case.”) (“FilmOn Cal”).
3
WPIX, Inc. v. IVI, Inc., 691 F.3d 275 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Ivi II”).
4
Fox TV Stations, Inc. v. FilmOn X, LLC, No. 13-758, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161304 (DC Dist. Ct. Dec. 2, 2015)
(“FilmOn DC”).
5
Ivi II, 691 F.3d at 279.
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transmissions of such signals or programs by wires, cables, microwave, or other communications
channels to subscribing members of the public who pay for such service.6

Parties that fall within this definition are eligible for a compulsory license granted by § 111. A
compulsory license is “[a] statutorily created license that allows certain parties to use copyrighted
material[,] without the explicit permission of the copyright owner[,] in exchange for a special
royalty.”7 Therefore, a compulsory license granted by § 111 allows a cable system, without the
express consent of any copyright owner, to retransmit broadcast television programming to its
subscribers for a statutorily imposed fee and subject to several regulations.8
a. Potential Effect of FilmOn Cal
The difference of opinion centers around two Internet retransmission companies—Ivi and
FilmOn—and their respective trials in the Second Circuit, Central District Court of California, and
DC District Court. Both companies argued their particular system was a cable system for purposes
of § 111(c).9
Applying Chevron deference, the Second Circuit held in Ivi II that Ivi was not a cable
system for two separate reasons.10 First, the legislative history of § 111 suggests that an Internet
retransmission company, such as Ivi, is not a cable company because: (1) Congress never expressly
amended § 111 to apply to Internet retransmission services, and (2) Congress enacted the provision
to address the difficulties of providing television reception by enabling the expansion of cable
systems on a localized, rather than nationwide, platform—a purpose of which Ivi was not seeking

6

17 U.S.C. § 111(f)(3) (2015).
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1060 (10th ed. 2014).
8
Ivi II, 691 F.3d at 278.
9
Ivi II, 691 F.3d at 279; FilmOn Cal 115 F. Supp. 3d at 1155-56; FilmOn DC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161304, at
*18-19.
10
Ivi II, 691 F.3d at 277.
7
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to address. 11 Second, the court adopted the agency’s interpretation of a cable system, which
expressly excludes Internet retransmission services, under step two of Chevron deference.12
In FilmOn Cal, Judge Wu broke with the Second Circuit and ruled in favor of Internet
retransmission services, stating that FilmOn should be considered a cable system so long as it is
able to show that its system meets other specific requirements, such as satisfying localization
requirements and complying with applicable Federal Communications Commission (hereinafter
“FCC”) regulations.13 Although the case is pending an appeal in the Ninth Circuit, FilmOn has
claimed that its new system—the Lanner System14—has improved localization services and will
placate the Copyright Office and broadcasters’ concerns.15
Analyzing the very same definition that Ivi II and FilmOn Cal addressed, the court in
FilmOn DC agreed with Ivi II’s outcome, but had a different line of reasoning. Unlike the Second
Circuit, the DC District Court did not find the definition of a cable system to be ambiguous and
held FilmOn is not a cable system because it uses the Internet, a pathway that it does not control,
to retransmit content to subscribers.16 Additionally, applying Skidmore deference, the DC court
found the Copyright Office’s interpretation persuasive, and for this reason denied FilmOn a
compulsory license.17

11

Id. at 281–83.
Id. at 281–85.
13
FilmOn Cal, 115 F. Supp. 3d at 1171.
14
Id. at 1156.
15
Id. at 1156–58; Margaret Harding McGill, FilmOn CEO Prods FCC to Bring Local Broadcast TV Online,
LAW360 (Oct. 09, 2015, 7:24 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/713112/filmon-ceo-prods-fcc-to-bring-localbroadcast-tv-online (FilmOn has expressed its willingness to abide by any applicable FCC regulations and has
recently spoken to the FCC about the issue).
16
FilmOn DC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161304, at *54–55.
17
Id. at *76, 81.
12
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b. Solution Summary
This comment will argue that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals should affirm the FilmOn
Cal decision and create a circuit split because the district court properly defined a cable system
under the Copyright Act and FilmOn’s system fits within said definition.
Part II of this comment will do the following: (1) summarize the history of cable systems and the
compulsory license; (2) analyze the legislative intent behind the license; (3) provide an in-depth
analysis of Ivi II, FilmOn Cal, FilmOn DC, and other related cases; and (4) discuss the philosophy
that presently underlies the compulsory license. 18 Part III will explain why the Ninth Circuit
should affirm the FilmOn Cal decision and break with the Second Circuit and DC District Court.19
II.

BACKGROUND
a. History: From Satellites on Hilltops to TV on Your Lap
i. The Traditional Cable Systems
The compulsory license emerged in response to two Supreme Court decisions from 1968

and 1974, which held the traditional cable systems at issue were not “performing” under the
Copyright Act when they retransmitted broadcasters’ programming.20 The first case, Fortnightly
Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., dealt with a cable system that used antennas placed on hills
above cities to distribute copyrighted local television broadcasting to their subscribers’ homes.21
The Court determined that because the subscribers ultimately chose what they were viewing and
the cable systems simply retransmitted uninterrupted and unedited programming, such systems did

18

See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
20
These decisions referred to cable systems as Community Antenna Television (hereinafter “CATV”) systems.
Courts and academics now refer to CATV systems as cable systems. ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 U.S. 2498, 2505
(2014) (“Aereo III”).
21
Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 392 (1968).
19
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not infringe any copyrights because the cable system functioned more like a viewer (who does not
perform) than a broadcaster (who does perform).22 Therefore, Fortnightly allowed cable systems
to retransmit copyrighted work to the masses and avoid paying rights holders for the
retransmissions. As cable systems evolved, the Supreme Court determined in Teleprompter v.
Columbia Broad. Sys. that new features of cable systems (e.g. their own broadcasting channels
and selling commercial space) were still non-infringing and allowed cable systems “to compete
more effectively with broadcasters for the television market.” 23 Fortnightly and Teleprompter
essentially authorized cable systems “to retransmit broadcast television programming without
incurring any costs to the copyright owners.”24
ii. The Copyright Act of 1976
Congress—wanting to respect the rights of copyright holders and ensure that copyright
holders received compensation for their works—made several amendments to the Copyright Act
that affect cable systems.25 Congress enacted the § 111(c) compulsory license requiring cable
systems pay copyright owners to retransmit the owners’ content. 26 With this statute, Congress
overturned Fortnightly and Teleprompter, declaring cable systems’ retransmissions to be
performances and requiring cable systems pay a fee to retransmit such performances to the
public.27 The compulsory license balances two ideals: the societal benefit cable systems provide
(expansive access to television programming) with the significance of respecting one’s property
rights. 28 Further, Congress passed the statute to combat the undue burden of requiring cable

22

Id. at 400–01.
Id.
24
WPIX, Inc. v. Ivi, Inc. (“Ivi I”), 765 F. Supp. 2d 594, 602 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (emphasis added).
25
Aereo III, 134 U.S. at 2506.
26
Ivi II, 691 F.3d at 271.
27
Aereo III, 134 U.S. at 2505.
28
See Ivi II, 691 F.3d at 282; U.S. Copyright Office, Satellite Home Viewer Extension and Reauthorization
Act Section 109 Report 1 (2008) at 1, 3 (hereinafter “SHVERA Report”).
23
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systems to negotiate with each and every copyright owner to retransmit broadcast signals. 29 The
license is conditioned on reporting requirements, payment of royalties, a ban on the substitution
or deletion of commercials, and geographical limitations on the license for programs broadcasted
by Canadian or Mexican stations.30
iii. Satellites
Not long after the amendments, satellite companies entered the retransmission market,
requesting compulsory licenses. In Nat’l Broad. Co. v. Satellite Broad. Networks, Inc., the
Eleventh Circuit held that satellite carriers qualify as a cable system under § 111 and were entitled
to compulsory licenses.31 Taking issue with this decision, the Copyright Office explained that
satellites should not be entitled to a compulsory license because the localized intent of the license
does not apply to national retransmission services and satellites are not regulated by the FCC.32
In response, Congress enacted the Satellite Home Viewer Act, which denied satellite
carriers a § 111(c) compulsory license, but provided them a separate statutory license.33 Then in
1999 Congress enacted 17 U.S.C. § 122, authorizing satellite carriers—once criticized for
supporting a nationwide service—to retransmit local broadcast programming back into a local
market.34 Congress has actively legislated in this area, amending § 122 five times since 2002.35
iv. Internet Retransmission Services: The Aereo Decision

29

H.R. REP. 94-1476, at 5569, 5704 (1976).
Id. at 5704.
31
Nat’l Broad. Co. v. Satellite Broad. Networks, Inc., 940 F.2d 1467, 1471 (11th Cir. 1991).
32
57 Fed. Reg. 3284 (Jan. 29, 1992) (codified at 37 C.F.R. § 201.17).
33
See 17 U.S.C. § 119; 56 Fed. Reg. 31,580 (1991); 57 Fed. Reg. 3283 (1992).
34
FilmOn DC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161304, at *56 n.17.
35
FilmOn Cal, 115 F. Supp. 3d at 1162.
30
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The most recent development within this area of law (as well as the central focus of this
comment) is Aereo III, where the Supreme Court determined that an Internet-based retransmission
service publicly performs through its retransmissions of copyright owners’ content.36
Aereo—which is now defunct—provided retransmissions of TV broadcasts through
thousands of small antennas, each of which were attributed to a single, active Aereo subscriber at
any time (i.e., no two Aereo subscribers would be assigned the same antenna at once).37 The
subscriber first selected a channel for Aereo’s services to translate into data that could be used
over the Internet. 38 The data was saved to one of Aereo’s servers and retransmitted to that
individual’s computer for streaming.39 If two subscribers clicked to view the same programming
at the same time, they would each receive an individual copy made for them, but of the same
material.40
Aereo’s main argument paralleled the arguments made by the cable systems in Fortnightly
and Teleprompter. 41 Aereo argued that it does not publicly perform the copyright, but rather
provides equipment; any performance that may occur happens at the hands of the subscriber.42 If
the court agreed that Aereo’s retransmissions do not constitute a public performance, then Aereo
would not be infringing the copyrights of the content it displayed. Additionally, Aereo argued that
it only created and retransmitted personal copies of the content to their subscribers because there
was only one active subscriber for any one antenna.43 The Supreme Court disagreed, ruling: (1)
Aereo was not just an equipment provider because their systems perform copyrighted material,

36

Aereo III, 134 U.S. at 2511.
Id. at 2503.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 2511.
42
Id. at 2504.
43
Id. at 2508–09.
37
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and (2) Aereo performs when it publicly displays “the same contemporaneous[] [programming to
multiple people]” (i.e., the public)—despite its “personal copies” assertion.44 Therefore, Internet
retransmission services, like Aereo, publicly perform when they retransmit copyrighted works.
Absent a license from the proper rights holders, such retransmissions infringe the copyright
holders’ rights.
In its opinion, the Supreme Court noted Aereo’s system bore an “overwhelming likeness
to the cable companies targeted by the 1976 amendments” and stated an Internet-based service’s
overall commercial objective is no different than a cable companies.45 Further, at oral argument
Justice Sonia Sotomayer stated, “I look at the definition of a cable company, and [Aereo] seems
to fit.” 46 Using these comments, Aereo raised a new argument on remand in the SDNY: the
comparisons laid out in the opinion and Justice Sotomayer’s statements held, or at the very least
inferred, Aereo was a cable system.47 In a short opinion, the court dismissed the notion that such
statements or comments could have any legal effect and that the analogies made between cable
systems and the CATV systems were only for the purposes of finding Aereo to publicly perform.48
The court stated that simply because Aereo was found to perform publicly does not render it a
cable system.49
b. Congress and the Copyright Office on the Compulsory License
i. Legislative Intent

44

Id. at 2506, 2510.
Id. at 2508.
46
Joe Mullin, Analysis: New Motions Show Gaping Holes in Supreme Court’s Ruling, ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 04,
2014, 4:52 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/08/aereo-tells-court-its-bleeding-to-deathbut-gets-no-relief/.
47
ABC v. Aereo, Inc., 12-cv-1540, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150555, at *17 (several other failed defenses were raised)
(“Aereo IV”).
48
Id. at *19–20 (“only the justices written opinions have the force of law”).
49
Id. at *18.
45
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Congress created § 111 to balance the societal benefits a cable system provides to the
viewing public, with the security that must be honored and upheld with a copyright.50 Further,
Congress was aware of the impracticality of requiring a potential cable system to negotiate with
every individual copyright owner it wished to retransmit.51 In order to address these competing
interests, it created a statutorily defined royalty.52
ii. Copyright Office’s Interpretation
The Copyright Office does not believe Internet retransmission services should qualify for
a compulsory license.53 They consider some differences, such as the nature of delivery, to be
fundamental and urge the withholding of a license.54 Their principal concern, however, is whether
Internet retransmissions can be controlled geographically. 55 The localization of transmissions
serves several ends, such as allowing broadcasters to sell advertising space based on region and
deliver content to viewers in different time zones appropriately.56
The Copyright Office first examined the issue presented by Internet retransmission services
in 1999, determining that it was too early to grant the services a compulsory license. In subsequent
years, the Copyright Office has made clear its position that Internet retransmission services should
not receive compulsory licenses.57 However, when discussing “new distribution technologies” in
a recent report, the Copyright Office included the following statement:
To be clear, the Office is not against new distribution models that use Internet protocol to deliver
programming, but only opposes the circumstance where any online content aggregator would have
the ability to use a statutory license to sidestep private agreements and free from any of the
50

Ivi II, 691 F.3d at 281.
See supra Part II.a (The Copyright Act of 1976).
52
See supra Part II.a (The Copyright Act of 1976).
53
Letter from J. Charlesworth, Copyright Office General Counsel (July 23, 2014), Pls.’ Appx. Ex. 1 at 3.
54
Statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, before the Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual
Property, Committee on the Judiciary (June 15, 2000).
55
Letter of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights to the honorable Howard Coble (Nov. 10, 1999) (“Our principal
concern is the extent to which Internet retransmissions of broadcast signals can be controlled geographically”).
56
Ivi II 691 F.3d at 285.
57
Statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, before the Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual
Property, Committee on the Judiciary (June 15, 2000)
51
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limitations imposed on cable operators and satellite carriers by the Communications Act and the
FCC’s rules.58

Additionally, the Office has acknowledged the issues presented by such an innovation are
entangled with communications law and policy issues, the analysis of which is outside their
expertise.59
iii. Current Ideology of the Compulsory License
Internet retransmission services are not alone in being scrutinized by the Copyright Office;
the Office actually has a longstanding opposition to the compulsory license itself.60 The Copyright
Office believes the compulsory license allows cable systems to carry local signals for a de minimis
fee and that a government-administered license “prevents the marketplace from deciding the fair
value of copyrighted works.”61 They see a better solution as allowing representatives from the
several industries involved and the users to negotiate terms.62
c. Ivi II, FilmOn Cal, and FilmOn DC
This section will discuss the systems and business model of the respective Internet
retransmission systems of Ivi and FilmOn and will further unpack each court’s analysis of the
issue. Finally, it will situate the discussion within the greater, national context by examining one
other case from the Southern District of New York (hereinafter the “SDNY”) where the same issue
and argument took place.
i. Ivi II

58

U.S. Copyright Office, SHVERA Report (2008) at 188.
Copyright Office STELA Report (Aug. 29, 2011), Pls.’ Appendix, Ex. 3 at 16.
60
Statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, before the Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual
Property, Committee on the Judiciary (June 15, 2000)
61
Id.
62
Id.
59

10

Ivi’s system worked like most cable systems because it captured and retransmitted
broadcast signals from stations located across the country; the system differed from cable systems
in two ways:
(1)

rather than being restricted to one’s local market broadcasting, any Ivi subscriber
was able to view, without altering their computer settings, live streams from any local
station in New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, or Seattle;63 and

(2)

Ivi’s service did not comply with the applicable rules, regulations, or authorizations
of the FCC.64

After transmitting the signal to their subscribers, Ivi rendered the content unusable and prevented
it from being viewed, captured, or passed along by its consumers.65
To determine the statute’s intent, Ivi II applied Chevron deference.66 Chevron deference
is generally warranted when an agency’s interpretation of the statute is available, almost always
through formal notice.67 Chevron first requires the court to “consider whether Congress has clearly
spoken on the issue.”68 If such intent is clear, no more analysis need be done, but if it appears
ambiguous the court must turn to the legislative history to determine the statute’s intent.69 If still
no affirmative intent can be gathered, step two instructs the court to “defer to an agency’s
interpretation of the statute, so long as it is reasonable.”70

63

Ivi II, 691 F.3d at 282.
Ivi I, 765 F. Supp. 2d at 599.
65
Id. at 298.
66
Ivi II, 691 F.3d at 279.
67
FilmOn DC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161304, at *69 (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230–31
(2001)).
68
Ivi II, 691 F.3d at 279 (citing Cohen v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 498 F.3d 111, 116 (2d Cir. 2007))
69
Ivi II, 691 F.3d at 279.
70
Id. (internal quotations omitted)
64
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In applying step one, the court found Congress’s intent unclear.71 Specifically, the court
could not conclude whether Ivi’s “service (1) is or utilizes a ‘facility’ (2) that receives and
retransmits signals (3) through [a prescribed communication channel].” 72 Ivi attempted to fit
within the definition of a cable system, arguing that it operated plainly a facility per the definition
of a cable system; however, Ivi never “identified the location or nature of its facility.”73
Since the court found § 111(f)(3) to be ambiguous, it looked to the legislative history and
found that § 111’s intent was to address the issues of reception and remote access to broadcasting
that supports localized, not nationwide, systems. 74 This analysis proscribed the compulsory
license from applying to Ivi’s system because it provided nationwide service.75 To remove any
doubt about the validity of its interpretation of the statute, the court moved on to step two of the
Chevron analysis and applied the Copyright Office’s interpretation of § 111 as it pertains to
Internet retransmission services. 76 The court sided with the Copyright Office’s interpretation,
finding it “reasonable and persuasive.”77
ii. FilmOn Cal
Just prior to litigation, FilmOn employed two different retransmission systems: (a) a trailer
system, and (b) a Lanner system.78 The trailer system was largely similar to Aereo’s and was
subsequently destroyed by FilmOn prior to litigation.79 The Lanner system, on the other hand,
features “a single master antenna placed on the roof of a commercial data center, which routes

71

Id. at 280.
Id. (emphasis added).
73
Id. at 280 n.6.
74
See supra Part II.a (The Copyright Act of 1976)
75
Ivi II, 691 F.3d at 284.
76
Id. at 283.
77
Id. at 284. See supra Part II.b (ii).
78
FilmOn Cal, 115 F. Supp. 3d at 1156.
79
Id. at 1158 n.7.
72
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signals to an antenna box where the signals are amplified and captured by small antennas.”80 The
user then selects a program to watch from a list on FilmOn’s website and that program is
transmitted to their computer via FilmOn’s servers via the Internet.81 As a way of managing a
subscriber’s access to their respective local channels, FilmOn processes its subscribers’ requests
from a local facility within a subscriber’s region.82 In anticipation of their case in the Ninth Circuit,
FilmOn also modified their system to enhance their localization services by requiring: (1) a user’s
credit card address and (2) a viewing device to be in the market area of which it was receiving.83
FilmOn’s system also employs a security measure in the form of an “encryption token” that ensures
the user with the authorized IP address is the only one able to access the broadcast stream.84
FilmOn, unlike Ivi, focused its arguments and efforts leading up to litigation on closing the
alleged gap between a more traditional cable system and their system:
(1) FilmOn restarted their operations as a Multichannel Video Programming Distributor to
better fit within the FCC regulations;85
(2) FilmOn announced—and continues to express—their willingness and ability to comply
with all applicable regulations, including FCC ones;86 and
(3) FilmOn’s system employs several localization safeguards to ensure subscribers are viewing
only their local markets.87

80

Id. at 1156.
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id at *9–10.
84
Id. at 1157.
85
Id. at 1159 (“a multichannel video programming distributor (MVPD) is any person such as . . . a cable operator, a
multichannel multipoint distribution service, a direct broadcast satellite service, or a television receive-only satellite
program distributor, who makes available for purchase, by subscribers or customers, multiple channels of video
programming”).
86
Id. at 1170.
87
Id. at 1156–58.
81
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Proving their eagerness to operate accordingly, FilmOn mailed over a hundred letters to
broadcasters requesting knowledge of whether the broadcasters would elect “must-carry” status as
required by FCC regulations. 88 Additionally, per the Copyright Office’s compulsory license
requirements, FilmOn submitted to them their statements of accounting and paid corresponding
fees. 89
Breaking from Ivi II, the court in FilmOn Cal did not inquire into the legislative history or
move onto the second step of Chevron because it did not have the same questions as Ivi II,
determining Congress’s definition of a cable system to be clear.90 Namely, Judge Wu did not
probe whether the Internet is a facility.91 The buildings located wholly in particular states and host
FilmOn’s retransmitting antennas are the facilities.92 Before any content is retransmitted, these
physical facilities receive the broadcasters’ signals.93 From there the content it retransmitted via
“wires, cables, microwave, or other communication channels to the corresponding subscribers.”94
Therefore, per the Copyright Act’s definition of a cable system, FilmOn maintains and controls
the facilities that are used for the retransmissions and the operation that in fact precedes the Internet
in FilmOn’s scheme.

95

The court went on to distinguish Ivi II by determining the terms

“headends” and “contiguous communities” do not have any bearing on the definition of a cable
system, but “merely provide[] that certain commonly owned cable systems will be treated as a
single system for purposes of computing a royalty.”96 As such, due to the unambiguous, express

88

Id. at 1159.
Id. at 1159 (during this period FilmOn failed to pay royalties to the opposing parties involved in this matter).
90
Id. at 1167 (“[I]t is difficult to recognize he ambiguity the Second Circuit saw in the statute, at least as applied to
the facts of this case”).
91
Id.
92
Id at 1167 (adding that the Copyright Office employed a “strange reading of the words ‘facility’ and
‘communications’ channel,” and that Ivi II’s reading of § 111 was “overly narrow”).
93
Id.
94
Id. at *40.
95
Id. at 1167–68 (emphasis added).
96
Id. at 1168.
89
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language of Congress, the court stopped at the first step of Chevron deference, deciding that
FilmOn was a cable system and therefore entitled to a compulsory license granted under § 111.97
No legislative history analysis or agency deference would be necessary as stipulated through
Chevron deference.98
iii. FilmOn DC
Less than five months after Judge Wu’s decision, FilmOn DC, a concurrent case involving
the same parties as FilmOn Cal and over the same matter, concluded, but reached a different
result—while the verdict had the same overall outcome as Ivi II, the DC court’s analysis was
different.99 The court first held that FilmOn’s reliance on the Internet rendered it incapable of
being a cable system under § 111(f)(3) because its physical facilities first retransmit the signals to
Internet service providers, as opposed to the subscribers directly.100 Despite the fact that FilmOn’s
system uses “cables, wires, and microwaves,” it involves a process that utilizes “a global network
of interconnected computers.”101 The court interpreted § 111(f)(3) to read, “any system that fails
to encompass the distribution medium and does not retransmit the signals directly to the subscriber
does not qualify as a cable system.” 102 Since FilmOn does not control the entirety of its
retransmissions path to subscribers it is not a cable system.103 Specifically, the court found Internet
retransmission systems differ from the cable systems in 1976 that “controlled the entire
transmission path leading directly to the subscribers.”104

97

Id. at 1171.
Id. at 1166.
99
FilmOnDC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161304, at *55.
100
Id. at *54
101
Id.
102
Id. at *55.
103
Id. at *55.
104
Id. *57–58 (“The Internet also relies on multiple other types of distribution media, such as satellite, cellular
networks, and wifi”)
98
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The court also denied the language, “or other communications channels” in § 111(c)
expressed Congress’s intent for the compulsory license to encompass evolving technologies.105
The court cited the ancient canon ejusdem generis, which “teach[es] that when a statute sets out a
series of specific items ending with a general term, that general term is confined to covering
subjects comparable to the specifics it follows.”106 The court concluded that the Internet is not
similar to or of the same kind as “wires, cables, or microwave” because it “operates through
nebulous international connections in cyberspace thus not constituting a ‘channel’ similar to
‘wires, cables or microwave.’”107
Additionally, the court broke from Ivi II by denying to apply Chevron deference due to the
absence of any formal rulemaking by the Copyright Office. 108 Instead, the DC court applied
Skidmore deference. 109 When determining whether to apply Skidmore deference, courts must
“look to the degree of [an] agency’s care, its consistency, formality, and relative expertness, and
to the persuasiveness of the agency’s position.”110 The court found that the Copyright Office has
consistently interpreted § 111(f)(3) to deny Internet retransmission services are cable systems
because they are not “an inherently localized transmission media of limited availability. 111 The
court found this interpretation “persuasive because it is grounded in the statute’s text and
legislative history,” and, therefore, allowed Skidmore deference to be applied. 112 Due to the

105

Id. at *60–61.
Id. at 61.
107
Id. (brackets omitted). The court also refused a broad interpretation because it may violate international
obligations. Id. at *65.
108
Id. at *69–71 (“the Court will not apply Chevron deference in the absence of formal rulemaking here because the
Copyright Office issued regulations after notice-and-comment in other situations, such as those concerning satellite
carriers”)
109
Id. at *71.
110
Id. at *71.
111
Id. at *75–76.
112
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Internet’s worldwide capabilities, the court held FilmOn’s system is not inherently localized and
is inconsistent with the Copyright Office’s interpretation.113

d. Other Similar Cases
i. FilmOn SDNY
Following Aereo III, FilmOn relied on the comparisons made by the Supreme Court
between the traditional cable systems in Fortnightly and Teleprompter and Internet retransmission
systems, arguing that in light of such comparisons, FilmOn qualifies as a cable system. 114 The
court disagreed, holding FilmOn placed “too much importance” on the Supreme Court’s cable
system analogies, and that such analogies were “not the same as a judicial finding” that Aereo is a
cable system.115 Further, the court relied on its precedent from Ivi II.116
e. Current State of the Law
Unlike with the satellite carriers, Congress has yet to codify a statutory provision for
Internet-based retransmission services, despite several courts litigating the issue.117 In addition,
despite the well-documented history of displeasure from the Copyright Office, 118 the compulsory
license remains an integral part in providing broadcasting to the public and continues to be relied
upon for business arrangements. This leaves Internet TV with nowhere to turn but the courts in
their fight to provide the public with a new, yet familiar way to consume broadcasting.
i. FCC Taking Sides?
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The FCC is in the process of creating a proposal to determine whether Internet-based
services qualify as “multichannel video programming distributors” (hereinafter “MVPD”) under
communications law.119 The FCC Chairman summarized the proposed regulations:
With this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the Commission moves to update the Commission’s rules
to give video providers who operate over the internet—or any method of transmission—the same
access to programming that cable and satellite operators have. Big company control over access to
programming should not keep programs from being available over the Internet.120

The proposal would widen the FCC’s interpretation of MVPD to include any technology
that provides a linear stream or programming (i.e., services that provide scheduled TV
programming without DVR systems).121 Therefore, the outcome of this proposal may very well
decree Internet retransmission services compatible with FCC regulations. In FilmOn Cal Judge
Wu acknowledged this, but stated the notice would not affect his decision.122
III.

ANALYSIS
This section will set out the arguments for why the Ninth Circuit should affirm its district

court’s decision holding FilmOn’s Internet retransmission service to be a cable system for purposes
of § 111 of the Copyright Act. First, the application of Chevron deference in Ivi II is misapplied
because it is not at all obvious that that style of deference was warranted as the opinion’s missing
analysis would have you believe, and if any agency deference were to be applied, the Copyright
Office’s reasoning does not apply to FilmOn because FilmOn’s system answers their primary
concerns about Internet retransmission services.123 Second, Judge Wu provided a straightforward,
fair reading of § 111(f)(3) and correctly determined FilmOn’s Internet-based service fits well
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within it.124 Finally, the Ninth Circuit should take notice of the several analogies made between
Internet retransmission systems and cable systems throughout the several Internet TV opinions;
while it may not definitively show that the systems are cable systems, it provides further evidence
of their striking similarities.125
a. Agency Deference
i. The Second Circuit’s Misapplication of Chevron Deference
By applying Chevron deference, Ivi II held that Ivi was not a cable system by looking at
the legislative history of the compulsory license and definition of a cable system.126 To begin this
analysis, the Second Circuit stated, “[T]he Copyright Office . . . has spoken on the issue of whether
§ 111’s compulsory licenses extend to Internet retransmissions. Accordingly, we utilize [Chevron
deference].”127 This bare assertion, however, is not a correct analysis of the law because Chevron
deference is not simply warranted merely by an agency’s interpretation through administrative
statements.128 The scope of when Chevron deference may be applied has been limited by recent
decisions. 129 Generally, interpretations that lack the force of law do not warrant Chevron
deference (e.g., opinion letters, policy statements, agency manuals).130 Even though the absence
of a final regulation is not necessarily determinative, “the overwhelming number of cases [that
have applied] Chevron deference have reviewed the fruits of notice and comment rulemaking or
formal adjudication.”131
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The Copyright Office, although consistently opining that Internet retransmission services
are not entitled to compulsory licensing, has never issued regulations formally on the matter. 132
Its position comes from a collection of statements, policy documents, and congressional
testimonies.133 Having to speculate why the Second Circuit did what it did, FilmOn DC refused
to follow Ivi II due to the Second Circuit’s failure to explain why Chevron deference was
warranted.134 While the absence of a final regulation may not be determinative, “the Copyright
Office [has] issued [formal] regulations . . . in other [similar] situations, such as those concerning
satellite carriers,” but clearly refused here despite their continuing statements on the matter.135
Ivi II was as much an administrative law decision as it was a copyright law one. Given the
Copyright Office’s longstanding opposition to Internet retransmission systems, and the
compulsory license in general, it is no surprise that the Second Circuit ruled against Internet
retransmission systems. Chevron deference should not have been applied in Ivi II because of the
lack of formal rulemaking from the Copyright Office.
ii. Eliminating the Copyright Office’s Concerns
Although Ivi II and FilmOn DC did not apply the same degree of deference, the two courts
still utilized the same set of facts and opinions expressed by the Copyright Office. The Office’s
stance on the issue expressly rejects the idea that a service such as FilmOn could constitute a cable
system. 136 Utilizing Chevron deference, Ivi II adopted this interpretation, while FilmOn DC
employing, Skidmore deference, acknowledged the Office’s views were persuasive.137
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The Copyright Office’s interpretation of § 111, supports the notion to qualify for a
compulsory license, a cable system must retransmit localized content.138 While there should be no
doubt to this, this was a major concern in Ivi II because Ivi’s service was not at all localized,
allowing for a subscriber in New York to stream a Seattle broadcast.139 FilmOn, however, is the
catalyst in this equation because, unlike Ivi, FilmOn fully supports localization and plans to prove
that their system is capable of retransmitting localized broadcasts to the appropriate subscribers
within their specific region.140 As noted by FilmOn Cal and FilmOn DC, FilmOn has implemented
several measures to ensure their retransmissions are properly localized. 141 Therefore, the
Copyright Office’s geographical concern with Internet retransmission services in general, as cited
by the Ivi II and FilmOn DC decisions, will not apply to FilmOn so long as FilmOn can show on
appeal their service’s proficient localization measures.142
Another attribute of § 111 is that its “operation . . . hinge[s] on the FCC rules regulating
the cable industry.”143 Similar to the above analysis, FilmOn is not arguing that they will not or
cannot comply with FCC regulations, as Ivi did.144 Instead, FilmOn understands the importance
of compliance and has expressed its willingness and capability to observe all appropriate FCC
regulations. 145 Additionally, the Copyright Office has given compulsory licenses to similar
Internet retransmission companies like AT&T U-Verse and Verizon Fios, which are not subject to
the Communications Act.146 Finally, the FCC is in the process of creating a proposal that would
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allow Internet retransmission services to fall within their regulation.147 Despite opposition from
many of the same plaintiffs in the FilmOn and Ivi cases, FCC Chairman Tom Wheeler has recently
advocated to expand the definition of a cable system from the traditional definition utilized by the
FCC, to allow for a more competitive market.148

b. If It Walks Like a Duck . . .
The Ninth Circuit should affirm the District Court’s decision, holding FilmOn to be a cable
system under the Copyright Act because FilmOn operates physical facilities that receive
broadcaster signals and retransmit those signals; this is to say that the Internet is not the receiving
“facility,” per § 111(f)(3). Additionally, providing some clarity to a controversial question,
FilmOn and its competitors mirror cable systems in seemingly every way.149
i. “If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court,
as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress.”150
Applying the definition of a cable system, Ivi II and FilmOn DC both stopped at the same
inquiry: Is the Internet a facility? 151 Ivi II left its inquiry at “unclear,” but acknowledged that the
Internet is not a “tangible entity” that is required of a physical facility. 152 FilmOn DC stated the
Internet could not be a facility as defined by § 111(f)(3).153
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The definition of a cable system on its face requires: (1) there to be a facility that “receives”
the broadcasters’ signals; (2) that that facility be located in a state or territory; and (3) that the
facility retransmit the signals via “wires, cables, microwaves, or other communication channels to
subscribing members of the public.” The definition does not limit cable systems to those that
“encompass the distribution medium,” nor does it require a system’s retransmissions be “direct.”154
FilmOn Cal—rather than “focus[ing] on the mysterious ‘ether’” (a/k/a the Internet)—
simply found that FilmOn’s “antennas, located in particular buildings wholly within particular
states,” are the receiving facilities in accordance with § 111(f)(3). 155 These facilities then
retransmit the signals through familiar means, such as “wires, cables, microwave, or other
communication channels.”156 Therefore, the Internet is not the facility here.157 As FilmOn Cal
observed, all of the electrical instrumentalities—which FilmOn has control over and operates—
precede the Internet in its operation.158 Therefore, applying § 111’s definition of a cable system
to the facts, FilmOn’s operational facilities receive the signals, are physically located in several
states, and retransmit the signals through a prescribed communication channel to a localized
geographical region. Additionally, despite what FilmOn DC held, § 111(f)(3) makes no mention
of a requirement for signals to directly retransmit to subscribers. 159 Furthermore, even if
legislative history purports otherwise, that history was broken when AT&T Uverse and Verizon
Fios were granted a § 111(c) compulsory license because they use the Internet.
Next Ivi II and FilmOn DC, agreeing with the Copyright Office, stated the terms
“headends” and “contiguous communities,” found in the second sentence of the cable system
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definition, evinced a localized service and not a nationwide one; providing further proof that
Internet-based retransmission services system are not cable systems.160 This should not affect the
Ninth Circuit’s determination because: (1) as Judge Wu held, the second sentence of the definition
of cable system is intended to distinguish “larger [cable] system[s] for purposes of the royalty
determination,” instead of modifying the definition of cable systems; and (2) even if we were to
accept this reading, FilmOn’s service still fits within it so long as localization safeguards exist. 161
To the first point, larger cable systems are treated as a single one to ensure they may contribute
larger per-subscriber royalty payments—this is the extent of this sentence’s purpose.162 To the
latter point, FilmOn has recently implemented a litany of localization measures and Judge Wu
granted them the opportunity to display such safeguards on appeal. 163 So long as they do so,
FilmOn will have removed its service from the likes of national ones (e.g. satellites, Aereo, and
Ivi) and rendered itself compatible with the localized intent of § 111.
ii. Likened to Cable Systems
It is not uncommon for a company to often be involved in reoccurring litigation with the
same issue or entity. Several overlapping broadcasting companies were Internet TV’s adversaries
in the FilmOn, Aereo, and Ivi cases. Aereo’s litigation dealt with a separate issue: whether an
Internet retransmission service publicly performs.164 Throughout Aereo III the Supreme Court
made undeniable comparisons between Aereo’s system and the traditional cable systems.
The Supreme Court in Aereo III explicitly related Aereo to cable systems in its opinion.165
First, after analyzing the history of the copyright act and compulsory license, the Court noted
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Aereo’s activities were “substantially similar” to traditional cable systems. 166 Immediately
following this sentence the Supreme Court cited a House Report, which stated a cable system’s
main operation is “based on the carriage of copyrighted program material.” 167 Second, the
Supreme Court noted any technological differences between Aereo’s system and cable systems—
not just traditional cable systems—did not distinguish Aereo’s system in general, its commercial
objective, nor its subscribers’ viewing experience.168
FilmOn SDNY and Aereo IV dismissed the argument that such remarks by the Supreme
Court established Internet retransmission services as cable systems.169 The courts were correct
that this was not the holding in Aereo III and the respective Internet retransmission companies
were misguided to only argue this, however, to dismiss the Supreme Court’s unambiguous
analogies would be another kind of fallacy. The courts limited the quotes to only bear on the issue
of public performance for purposes of the Transmit Clause, but their words and placement may
suggest more. Firstly, the court in Aereo IV mischaracterized the analogies as only pertaining to
traditional cable systems because the second example in the preceding paragraph describes an
instance where the Supreme Court relates it to cable systems in general; cable systems commercial
objective; and the eventual subscriber viewing experience.170 In examining the Transmit Clause,
the Supreme Court made clear the general operation of a cable system is no different than Internet
retransmission systems. This is to say that Aereo, and by comparison other Internet TV systems,
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communicate retransmissions to subscribers analogous to those cable systems already entitled to
compulsory licensing.
Furthermore, the antagonistic broadcast companies even argued in Aereo II “that Aereo’s
[re]transmissions of broadcast television programs . . . are analogous to the retransmissions of
network programming made by cable systems.” 171 The broadcasters would go on to declare
Aereo’s system was “functionally equivalent to a cable television provider.” 172 Given the
analogies made by the Supreme Court and the broadcast companies, once FilmOn is able to display
its improved localization safeguards and comply with applicable regulations, what more bridges
need be gapped to show it is a cable system? Indeed an implication is not a holding, but it is a
significant connection that the Ninth Circuit should take notice of in its impending decision.
IV.

CONCLUSION
The Ivi II, FilmOn Cal, and FilmOn DC decisions provide insight to how one statute can

be interpreted several different ways. The decision can become more confusing when legislative
history from 40 years ago and an agency’s opinion enter the fray. FilmOn Cal establishes the best,
clear-cut interpretation of § 111. By reading the statute for what it is and correctly refraining from
the Copyright Office’s discouraging opinion, Judge Wu was able to correctly determine that
FilmOn’s system is a cable system within the definition and would be entitled to a compulsory
license following a display of its improved measures.

171
172

WNET Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 686 (2d Cir. 2013).
Id. at 693.

26

